Science behind winning the Rainbow Jersey
After Sunday’s performance by the British Cycling Team at the UCI Men’s World Championship Road Race I thought it might be of interest to give an insight into the science that contributed to winning the Rainbow Jersey. Firstly, although the team’s achievement is an impressive example of science, technology and comprehensive preparation it’s important to understand how this compares to their nearest competition. Most national teams probably had limited preparation and organisation prior to the event with one exception, the Australian team who, like the British team, have a national setup that includes coaching, research and development and most importantly funding for Olympic (non-professional) sports. So, it may well appear that cutting edge science resulted in Sunday’s victory but it doesn’t take a great deal of science to out think most of the other nations. The advent of lottery funding and the ambition of the management at British Cycling have transferred a successful track cycling team to a dominant force on the road. The contribution of science to this model is often labelled as the “aggregation of marginal gains”, which is a smart way of acknowledging that no single scientific intervention can contribute significantly and that it’s the hard work and non-scientific processes that give the biggest returns. However, half the process is how you present this to your competitors i.e. if it looks fast and shiny then it must be advantageous.
So, what was the science behind the more significant factors that put the British team ahead of its rivals? Well, to appreciate its contribution lets clarify the demands of the event. The chart below shows the speed profile of the race.
So, what was the science behind the more significant factors that put the British team ahead of its rivals? Well, to appreciate its contribution lets clarify the demands of the event. The chart below shows the speed profile of the race.
This might at first appear like a stock market graph but what it actually shows is the average lap speeds for key groups that played out the race. The first point to notice is that the initial break was established when selected riders attacked, but more significantly due to a general slowing of the peloton. This is characteristic of break formations, as the peloton often stops chasing those riders intent on escaping. In the case of this initial break, the riders that eventually escaped were deemed no threat to those teams interested in controlling the peloton for a bunch sprint finish.
The third lap was the slowest of the race (peloton’s average speed = 37kph) and coincided with the break achieving its biggest lead (>8 minutes). This prompted the British and German teams to take control of the peloton and prevent the time gap increasing by matching the break’s speed. Then they reduced the gap by slowly accelerating the peloton to a faster average speed than the break (shown as differing gradients on the graph for laps 4 to 7). For this period the break averaged 44kph and the peloton closer to 46kph. This reduced the time gap to about 5 minutes which encouraged Paris Roubaix winner, Johan van Summeren, to initiate a chase group of 6 riders (including riders from Australia, France, Italy, Belgium & Luxembourg). They eventually merged with the leaders on lap 12 by riding faster than the peloton (green vs. red lines), although both were faster than the break (chasers = 47.3kph, peloton = 46.5kph & leaders 43.8kph). This effort proved costly as these riders later faded and the peloton soon closed the gap to within a minute. This prompted Anthony Roux’s suicide attack (purple line) which only served to prevent the peloton catching the break more quickly. In fact, Tour de France protagonist, Thomas Voecklar along with Nicki Sörensen and Klaas Lodewyck jumped passed Roux for the final lap before the peloton retained the lead of the race into the finishing kilometres.
The third lap was the slowest of the race (peloton’s average speed = 37kph) and coincided with the break achieving its biggest lead (>8 minutes). This prompted the British and German teams to take control of the peloton and prevent the time gap increasing by matching the break’s speed. Then they reduced the gap by slowly accelerating the peloton to a faster average speed than the break (shown as differing gradients on the graph for laps 4 to 7). For this period the break averaged 44kph and the peloton closer to 46kph. This reduced the time gap to about 5 minutes which encouraged Paris Roubaix winner, Johan van Summeren, to initiate a chase group of 6 riders (including riders from Australia, France, Italy, Belgium & Luxembourg). They eventually merged with the leaders on lap 12 by riding faster than the peloton (green vs. red lines), although both were faster than the break (chasers = 47.3kph, peloton = 46.5kph & leaders 43.8kph). This effort proved costly as these riders later faded and the peloton soon closed the gap to within a minute. This prompted Anthony Roux’s suicide attack (purple line) which only served to prevent the peloton catching the break more quickly. In fact, Tour de France protagonist, Thomas Voecklar along with Nicki Sörensen and Klaas Lodewyck jumped passed Roux for the final lap before the peloton retained the lead of the race into the finishing kilometres.
So, how did the British team influence these events? Well, firstly the course presented little in the way of topographical features that could impact upon the race directly so the riders and teams were able to control proceedings. With the race favourite and best sprinter the British team implemented “Plan A” from the outset. The most impressive part of this team’s performance was the manner in which they influenced the race from such an early stage. Steve Cummings and Chris Froome rode (with assistance from Bert Grabsch, Andreas Klier & Benjamin King) at a pace close to their functional thresholds. They used their experience and judgement (with guidance from David Millar & Jeremy Hunt) to avoid spending too much time above this intensity thus preventing the early onset of fatigue. Without the benefit of radios the team were still able to manage the time gap to the break using the display posted above the finish line as a reference and the occasional sojourn to the team car. The first example of “marginal gains” was also evident here as the British team had placed staff with a display board about halfway around the course providing further information on the time gaps as they developed. Obviously avoiding the effort required to collect this information from the team car is essential, especially in a race like the World Championships where energy conservation is fundamental to a winning performance.
The concept of improved energy conservation was clearly the focus of the team’s scientific strategy. All the riders wore skinsuits (without pockets) some had helmets with filled vents (plastic cover for Cavendish) and most used deep section rims. All providing an aerodynamic advantage by reducing the effort required to ride on a course where air resistance was a more significant factor than gravity. The precise benefits remain a closely kept secret and rightly so, but from the data available probably equates to a 4-5% advantage. Over the course of a 6 hour event this performance gain is considerable, not only by helping the riders to conserve energy but also aiding with a tactic that could have resulted in the least efficient way to ride the event.
With an estimated cost in excess of 5000 kJ managing energy intake was also a major performance factor. However, with the opportunity to take drinks and food every lap the riders were better positioned to meet the energy demands of this event compared with a more typical one day race. Using nutritional strategies to maximise energy delivery and maintain hydration the British team further addressed the fundamental issue of managing fatigue, which including taking bottles and mussettes from the team soigneurs whilst riding through the feed zone at the front of the peloton. Riding as a team in this position also reduced the risk of crashing in the mêlée of the feed zone well as on the more narrow sections of the course. Interestingly, the team only used selected riders for each section of the race but were able to protect and support one another riding in a team time trial formation, whilst the remainder of the peloton assumed they were at a disadvantage riding so close to the front. The team had clearly identified the 400m slope (3.8%) at the finish as well as the 500m (5.0%) twisting slope at 3km as the only sections offering an advantage to those intent on preventing a bunch sprint finish. By controlling the peloton’s speed through these sections the British team were able to reduce the opportunity for other riders to escape. This was exemplified on the final lap by Bradley Wiggins, during which he single handedly closed the gap to the late break of Voecklar and co and then rode at the head of the peloton at 51kph for 10km preventing any late attacks and ensuring Mark Cavendish was in contention for the final sprint. Then, even with a less than ideal lead-out on an uphill sprint Cavendish was able to win. His sprint was slowed by the gradient but the duration was similar to his effort on the Champs Elysées in this year’s Tour de France;
With an estimated cost in excess of 5000 kJ managing energy intake was also a major performance factor. However, with the opportunity to take drinks and food every lap the riders were better positioned to meet the energy demands of this event compared with a more typical one day race. Using nutritional strategies to maximise energy delivery and maintain hydration the British team further addressed the fundamental issue of managing fatigue, which including taking bottles and mussettes from the team soigneurs whilst riding through the feed zone at the front of the peloton. Riding as a team in this position also reduced the risk of crashing in the mêlée of the feed zone well as on the more narrow sections of the course. Interestingly, the team only used selected riders for each section of the race but were able to protect and support one another riding in a team time trial formation, whilst the remainder of the peloton assumed they were at a disadvantage riding so close to the front. The team had clearly identified the 400m slope (3.8%) at the finish as well as the 500m (5.0%) twisting slope at 3km as the only sections offering an advantage to those intent on preventing a bunch sprint finish. By controlling the peloton’s speed through these sections the British team were able to reduce the opportunity for other riders to escape. This was exemplified on the final lap by Bradley Wiggins, during which he single handedly closed the gap to the late break of Voecklar and co and then rode at the head of the peloton at 51kph for 10km preventing any late attacks and ensuring Mark Cavendish was in contention for the final sprint. Then, even with a less than ideal lead-out on an uphill sprint Cavendish was able to win. His sprint was slowed by the gradient but the duration was similar to his effort on the Champs Elysées in this year’s Tour de France;
For those doubters of the effect of an aggregation of marginal gains, the image below shows that the winning margin was only 3 hundredths of a second or 0.001% of the winning time. So the helmet cover alone could have been the deciding factor!
Select the links below to view previous race analysis
| Tour of Britain - Stage 8.pdf |
| Tour of Britain - Stage 7.pdf |
| Tour of Britain - Stage 6.pdf |
| Tour of Britain - Stage 5.pdf |
| Tour of Britain - Stage 4.pdf |
| Tour of Britain - Stage 3.pdf |
| Tour of Britain - Stage 2.pdf |
| Tour of Britain - Stage 1.pdf |
| Richmond Grand Prix - 04/09/11.pdf |
